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ABSTRACT Starting from a distinction between a critical and an ascetic tradition in philosophy and 
taking into account their different stances towards the present, the article proposes a practice of 
philosophy of education within the ascetic tradition. In this tradition, the work of philosophy is in the 
first place a work on the self – that is, putting oneself to ‘the test of contemporary reality’ - implying an 
enlightenment not of others but of oneself; however, of oneself not as subject of knowledge, but as 
subject of action. Putting oneself to the test is, therefore, an exercise in the context of self-education. 
The article indicates how this exercise can be described as an exercise of/in thought, how it has to be 
conceived not as a private matter but as a public gesture and as a condition for a truth-telling that is in 
the first place illuminating and inviting. In order to do so, the article first recalls how Hannah Arendt 
describes her own work and how this indicates what kind of philosophical practice is entailed in the 
ascetic tradition. In line with this description, a topical example (i.e. the films of the Belgian Dardenne 
brothers) is offered of how educational philosophical research in this tradition is carried out today. 
And, finally, it is clarified how this relates to a proposal for doing ‘empirical’ philosophical research and 
for creating laboratories. 
A widespread practice of philosophy of education conceives of it as a kind of supplementary inquiry 
or meta-reflection that regards educational research and practice itself as an object of knowledge. Such 
a practice belongs to a critical tradition that conceives of the work of philosophy as the work of 
judgement, ordering, justification, selection, concept clarification, interpretation and explication, 
and is ‘critical’ in the sense that it is in one way or another oriented towards validity claims (either 
ethical/normative or epistemological). This means that it puts reality (educational research and 
theory, educational policy and practice) to the test of its own thinking: the test of argumentative 
logic, of interpretive procedures, of theoretical or practical principles, of theories... Therefore its 
utterances always assume a critical-judgemental role for educational scholars. Its truth-telling has 
something either of a demonstration (wanting to teach something), a judgement (valid/not-valid) 
or a de-mystification (revealing what is underlying or presupposed, or denouncing illusions). 
It is my aim here not to question this critical tradition, but to offer a modest reflection on the 
value of another, more marginal tradition in philosophy, which we can call the ascetic tradition. In 
this tradition, the work of philosophy is in the first place a work on the self – that is, putting oneself to 
‘the test of contemporary reality’, implying an enlightenment not of others but of oneself – however, 
of oneself not as subject of knowledge but as subject of action. Putting oneself to test is, therefore, 
an exercise in the context of self-education. As I will try to indicate, this exercise, which various 
authors (Arendt, 1968; Wittgenstein, 1980; Foucault, 1986) described as an exercise of/in thought, has 
to be conceived not as a private matter but as a public gesture or a way to make things public and as 
a condition for a truth-telling that is in the first place illuminating, inviting, cutting, inspiring. In 
order to do so, I will first recall how Hannah Arendt describes her own philosophical work and 
how it is part of this ascetic tradition. In line with this description, I will then present a concrete 
example of how educational philosophical research in this tradition is carried out today. And 
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finally, I will clarify how this relates to a proposal for doing ‘empirical’ philosophical research and 
for creating laboratories. 
The Ascetic Tradition: putting oneself to the test of contemporary reality 
Hannah Arendt considers her own work in Between Past and Future to be ‘exercises in thought’, 
being mainly ‘experiments’ ‘arising out of the actuality of incidents’, and having the form of ‘essays’ 
(Arendt, 1968, pp. 14-15). Most interestingly she elaborates on the space/time of these exercises and 
states that the ‘proper region of thought’ is not the region ‘which Western metaphysics has 
dreamed [of] from Parmenides to Hegel’: a ‘timeless, spaceless, suprasensuous realm’ (p. 11), but 
what she calls the gap between past and future. But this gap, another name for the present, ‘is not 
the present as we usually understand it’, as a point in a continuous ‘flow of uninterrupted 
succession’ (p. 11), but it is the present ‘due exclusively to the presence of man’ (p. 10) – that is, the 
insertion into time of ‘a beginning’, of man as acting being. So, the space/time of the exercise of 
thought is the gap or present which ‘come[s] into being only with his own, self-inserting 
appearance’ (p. 10). The exercises of thought are concerned with the present, but the present is not 
what simply appears as such and before us (as an object of knowledge), it is what is experienced when 
we are, so to speak, present in the present (attending the present, taking care of it, being attentive), 
when ‘we’ insert ourselves and thus also expose ourselves to what is happening. That is to say that 
the present exists only in as far as man recognises or experiences him/herself not as a knowing 
subject but as a beginner, as an acting subject, ‘splitting up time in forces that work upon him/her’ 
(p. 11, italics mine), but that are, thus, in a way broken or interrupted in him/her (as beginning – 
where s/he stands). 
The exercise of thought is not a jumping out of the present, but on the contrary ‘remains 
bound to and is rooted in the present’. Although Arendt claims that the one who thinks is ‘ageless’ 
(i.e. has no history or biography), the time of thinking is not the time where one is ‘above the 
melee’ (Arendt, 1968, p. 12), it is precisely the present as the gap, and the way to live in this gap is 
thinking. Or, better, thinking is an activity immediately related to an existential question of how to 
live the present (‘how to move in the gap’), it has to do with myself as a subject of (right) action – 
that is, a subject who takes care of the present and of one’s presence in that present. The exercise of 
thought (which cannot be learned, according to Arendt, but has to be performed time and again) is 
a work on oneself, but as one who experiences oneself as a beginner, somebody who is ‘able to’ act 
and speak, suspending [1] historical time, suspending biographical time, suspending social time – 
that is, ageless, as Arendt says, but at the same time attached, attached to the present, present in the 
present. So thinking means not to forget oneself as a subject of action, as being an insertion in time. 
According to Arendt, the gap between past and future (which always existed due to the 
presence of man) was bridged by tradition, but now tradition is lost and has ceased throwing light 
on the future [2], and the present has become ‘a tangible reality and perplexity for all’, urging for 
exercises of thought to see ‘how to move in this gap’ (p. 14). However, this condition has also 
called into being all kinds of strategies to close the gap, to ignore it, to avoid thinking as exposing 
oneself to the present – that is, to immunise oneself against the fact that after tradition has been 
lost, one has to take up the challenge of living a truly ‘human’ life and to try the words (e.g. son, 
father, mother, daughter, child, etc.) and verbs (educating, living, etc.) again. If we refuse to expose 
ourselves to the present, being, as Arendt says, a ‘battlefield of forces’ rather than a home (p. 13), 
and to recognise ourselves as ‘acting’, then there remains only the experience of ‘sempiternal 
change of the world and the biological cycle of living creatures in it’ – things taking their course, 
and we only trying to protect or to adapt ourselves. 
In Men in Dark Times, Arendt writes: ‘what begins now, after the end of world history, is the 
history of mankind’ (1955, p. 90). And she writes at the end of her essay ‘What is Authority’ (and 
repeats at the end of ‘The Crisis in Education’) that this means ‘to be confronted anew, without the 
religious trust in a sacred beginning and without the protection of traditional and therefore self-
evident standards of behaviour, by the elementary problems of human living together’ (Arendt, 
1968, p. 141). Assuming the history of mankind (accepting that we are without sacred beginning 
and without destination) and taking up the confrontation means to ask and investigate how to 
make sense again of such ‘words’ as freedom or authority, how to conceive of education, culture, 
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etc. These are the exercises of thought which she offers in Between Past and Future. It is a kind of 
thinking which, as she writes, ‘is different from such mental processes as deducing, inducing and 
drawing conclusions’ (Arendt, 1968, p. 13). It is also not to interpret or to explain. ‘The only aim of 
the exercises in thought is to gain experience in how to think; it does not contain prescriptions on 
what to think or which truths to hold. Least of all do they intend to retie the broken thread of 
tradition or to invent some newfangled surrogates with which to fill the gap between past and 
future. ... The question is ... about how to move in this gap’ (p. 14). How to be present in/to the 
present, how to see the present anew, how to deal with it, what to think of it, how to relate to it 
and how to continue? These exercises are critical of traditional concepts, but this critique is not 
intended to ‘debunk’ (p. 14), unmask or demystify them. Starting from acknowledging that, in the 
strong sense, these concepts stopped meaning something, their meaning having ‘evaporated’ and 
left behind ‘empty shells’, the challenge they take up is rather ‘to distil from them anew their 
original spirit’ (p. 15). These exercises are to a large extent ‘experiments’, which ‘do not attempt to 
design some sort of utopian future’ (p. 14) or definite solutions, but are attempts to clarify some 
issues and to ‘gain some assurance in confronting specific questions’ (p. 15). These exercises are not 
part of an academic discipline, but rather are expressions of indiscipline. They arise out of the 
actuality of incidents of living experience (p. 14), their literary form is that of the essay and the 
work that of an experimenter (p. 15). The experience in thinking can only be won ‘in doing 
something’ (p. 14) whereby the trouble is ‘… that we seem to be neither equipped nor prepared for 
this activity of thinking, of settling down in the gap between past and future’ (p. 13), so that we 
have to look for equipment and preparation in order to elaborate our experimental and attentive 
attitude towards the (educational) present, of which we ourselves are part as far as we take up our 
insertion into time – that is, as far as we take care of ourselves (as acting subjects). 
Taking as a basis Arendt’s own description of her philosophical work as being exercises of 
thought, we can understand such philosophy to be educational in three senses. First it is a kind of 
investigation that implies a bringing into play of the researcher herself (her thoughts): a self-
education as ‘work on the self’ (Wittgenstein). But philosophy as an essay is, as well, a public 
gesture and is, therefore, also educational in the sense that it can have a meaning for others who 
are invited to share the experience (to put themselves to the test, not to receive teaching). And 
lastly, such philosophy can be educational in the sense that the present at stake is the educational 
present. 
In order to further clarify what such ‘exercises in/of thought’ entail and what they require, I 
now want briefly to sketch a topical example. 
The Example of the Films Made by the Belgian Dardenne Brothers 
Of course it may sound strange to take films as an example, but there is no reason why philosophy 
of education should only be concerned with books and lectures, and not with films. And although 
it is not my intention to invite the readers to stop writing and to make films, I want to indicate how 
this work is philosophical and educational, and I want to draw some indications out of it with 
regard to the kind of ‘work’ which, I believe, we could try to do today, what kind of work ethos it 
implies and what kind of requirements (in terms of ‘equipment and preparation’) it entails. 
The films of Luc and Jean-Pierre Dardenne all deal with issues that have to do with the 
relationship between children or adolescents and adults in our actual conditions.[3] However, they 
deal with these issues in such a way that their films not only reveal something about our 
educational present, but also present themselves as public gestures that constitute us into a 
thinking public. Their films are, in fact, studies of essential educational situations and matters: what 
does it mean to be a child, an adult, a father, a son, a mother, a daughter, a teacher, an apprentice? 
What does it mean, not in general, but in the concrete and sometimes extreme situations and 
conditions which society offers today? Their films investigate these questions and whether and how 
answers are given/found. In fact, we could say that they are showing us exercises of thought (with 
the main figures in the films trying to find out how to shape their relationships), and are in 
themselves such exercises. The films show an insertion in the continuum of time, a gap between 
past and future, and are themselves moving in such a gap, testifying to such insertion (that is also 
why they are able to offer us an insight in the ‘forces’ that are at work, to use the words of Arendt). 
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When asked why they are fascinated by the relationship between adults and children, the 
Dardenne brothers respond: 
Maybe it comes also from the fact that in the city where we make our films, we have seen 
families destroyed by economic crisis, drugs, unemployment, truancy, and now kids are earning 
more then their parents but from illegal means. People are more and more alone. When we first 
wrote La Promesse, we had an older character who was supposed to provide guidance to the 
younger characters. But then we realised that this was nostalgic – now, there is no one to be that 
voice. So we put them in a situation and asked the question, ‘how are these people, who are now 
alone and without the help of the past, going to find their way to be fully human?’ (Andrew, 
2006) 
Indeed, the films of the Dardennes ask this question in a fascinating and penetrating way. And it is 
not difficult to hear how this resounds with the question and task Hannah Arendt raised: today we 
are confronted again, without the protection of the past and the bridge of tradition, with the 
question of human living together. And their films make clear how this question as a concrete 
question ‘arising out of the actuality of incidents’ (i.e. the actuality of a small town in Belgium), and 
related to their personal experience, nevertheless is put before us in a way that it appears as a 
common question. Their local anchoring does not prevent the Dardenne brothers from making 
‘common’ or universal films. Their work investigates this question of how to be human today 
(how to find one’s way, alone and without help of the past) in such a way that it also becomes ‘our’ 
question, the question of the spectators. They invite us to be attentive, to see and listen and to 
think, they make us into a public, they gather us around this question and what is at stake in it, they 
also put us to the test (how to find one’s way, how to act in a right way, what it means to be a 
father, etc.). 
How do they arrive at this? First of all, they investigate the question as a radically open 
question, not as gatekeepers of the truth, but as truth seekers themselves. The fact that these films 
are imbued with ethical-philosophical and educational questions does not turn them into a 
moralising cinema; on the contrary, they give no easy answers and are not preaching any morality. 
They do not judge, neither do they prove or explain/explicate anything. Of course, in a way the 
films certainly have a frame and are framing, and this frame marks a space, but the space is no 
interior, no home, but a kind of space of exposition, of being exposed to things (happenings) that 
become exposed. 
Their films do not proclaim or defend any truth, they are no expression of a doctrine, theory 
or conviction, but in their films there is truth that shows itself in what is happening before the 
camera. Their camera registrates the truth of the words and deeds of the protagonists - a truth 
which shows itself to us and which manifests itself in an almost inescapable way. As one 
commentator wrote: 
I cannot remember to have seen films which are so objective, so purely registrating as yours. 
What makes your films so special is the apparent absence of rhetoric. That makes them 
sometimes also unbearable. Rhetoric in films offers the spectator the occasion to think: this is bad 
or terrible, but beautiful. You don’t offer the spectator this softening thought of ‘this is beautiful’, 
this possibility to feel distance towards the described reality and to look at it with the ironic gaze 
of the distinguished art expert. (Grunberg, 2008) 
In this context I would state that this cinema is in fact a very interesting form of empirical 
philosophy, maybe one of the most important, advanced and needed forms. One which is neither 
judging nor only observing facts and making them known, but one which illuminates a(n) 
(educational) reality – that is, one which makes that which is observed also ‘speak’, as it were, or 
better maybe, become ‘real’, something that ‘works’ and that offers ‘experience’ and not only 
knowledge (and that is the strong sense of ‘empirical’). They illuminate, not in the sense that they 
explain, teach a lesson, but in that they make something present. They do not re-present something 
and do not show us a scenario put into images, but registrate a happening before the camera. In 
this way they make something become ‘real’ and ‘present’: they make us attached, existentially 
involved in the question that the situation they show entails. And I believe that they can do this 
because they are themselves present in these films. They are present in the sense that these films 
are for themselves an exercise in thought, where they don’t know what is going to happen before 
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the camera, where they don’t know what exactly they are looking for, using the film-making as an 
attempt to literally make answers (to the question of the human) appear, answers which they 
themselves are not aware of at the moment they actually start the process. 
In an interview, J.-P. Dardenne says: 
Our documentaries were ‘pastoral’. [Indeed they made documentaries in the seventies and 
eighties.] The word had the central role, and the film served only as a ‘mise-en-scène’ of a 
testimony. Situations, places, actions were shown to sustain what was told in the story. In our 
documentaries the event or happening always lay in the past. It was re-told. In La Promesse this 
dwelling on words is replaced by the immediate present of events/happenings. The camera 
cannot choose a location which was thought of beforehand, the camera (together with us) also 
registrates for the first time what happens, without making a detour along a predefined logic. In 
La Promesse the camera registrates direct environments. (Sartor, 2001, p. 19; translation by 
author) 
The camera which is used is a hand-held camera, a camera which surprises and catches at the same 
time. The way they film makes clear that the camera does not know what is going to happen. The 
Dardenne brothers thus show us in a radical way film and no scenario. They don’t want to 
announce, name or define something before we have seen it. They are not defining what happens, 
as is the old philosophical dream, dreamt by analytical philosophers; they are not contextualising or 
historicising it as is the dream of hermeneutics; they are not deconstructing it as postmodern 
philosophy aspires to do; but they attempt to show the happenings as ‘actions’ – that is, as 
happenings in the gap between past and future, as experiments and attempts that start from the 
acceptance of one’s insertion in time – that start with the protagonists themselves, who try to find 
out what it means to be a son, a daughter, a teacher, a father, a mother ... and put things in motion. 
Every ‘given’ is first submitted to the test of film itself: naked presence and duration. Looking 
at their films, it is as if the words and deeds, the gestures, appear, as such, on their own, as a kind of 
‘empty shell’ that can start to get (new) meaning again. Only afterwards can we assign the 
fragments a place in the course of events. Because of their fascination for the sudden illumination 
of moments, the Dardennes let us often wait minutes before we grasp something of the meaning of 
a scene (i.e. they create suspension). However, this meaning does not refer to a story, but to a 
protagonist and a situation. Their cinema does not tell stories, does not narrate, but registrates. ‘To 
narrate impedes or obstructs existence,’ they note, referring to Rosetta: ‘the less one tells about a 
persona, the more it exists ... Rather than narrating, we have tried to find the gestures which were 
essential for the character’ (Sartor, 2001, p. 15, translation by author). The story does not precede 
the characters, but is organised around them and starts from them, it is these, their gestures and 
movements, their words, that offer the starting point and not the plot. The films therefore have no 
clear beginning or end. They have no history that explains the actions we see. The characters are 
there (present to the situation, and not absent, distracted); the camera registrates what they do or do 
not do, and this is more important than who they are and what will happen. What happens is also 
shown as fragments from a journey (un parcours), and not of a discourse (un discours). Very often, 
we as spectators are set in a situation and only gradually can we find out why the characters act as 
they do. Luc Dardenne notes: 
It’s to avoid explaining to the viewer that this character’s mother did this and so that’s why he’s 
behaving that way. Because when you do that, the character ceases to exist. This is why in 
mainstream cinema, when you explain why characters behave in a certain way, the audience 
understands, but really we have understood nothing. We want the viewers of our films not to be 
able to explain where they have come from and why they’re behaving that way, but they’ll be 
able to see that these characters will be able to get through - i.e. are able to act, to begin! 
(Andrew, 2006) 
One could say that the Dardennes show us how today fiction is necessary to make something 
appear as ‘real’ and to make appear the possibility to act. They make clear that fiction is necessary 
today to show the truth of action or the possibility of beginning (or of potentiality), and gather us 
(as a public) around such questions as: What does it mean to be father, son, teacher, mother ... 
today? Jorge Larrosa formulates the question (towards philosophers of education with regard to the 
actual transformations of educational institutions like schools and universities) as follows: ‘“We” 
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knew the old words (university, philosophy, education), but now we are no longer sure they mean 
anything. And we are not keen to learn the new ones: we do not trust them, they are irrelevant to 
us. Moreover, we are sad and tired at the course taken by things in general and by everything 
related to universities, philosophy and education in particular. ... Will we be capable of trying all 
the words and verbs once again: university, philosophy, education?’ (Larossa, 2010) 
Well, I believe that, to put it in a more general way, the Dardennes are doing precisely this: 
trying the words (teacher, student, father, son, mother, daughter, adult, child …), trying the verbs 
(educating, teaching …) once again where ‘things are taking their course’: they open a space of 
practical freedom. That is why their cinema is not only a realistic and hard cinema, but essentially 
also an optimistic cinema – something takes its course, but they present the gap between past and 
future and investigate how to move in this gap. They offer a kind of hope, but hope without 
foundation and guarantee, and precisely, therefore, pure (human) hope. Their films do not 
illustrate or tell or explain, but illuminate our educational present and bring it into play. There is 
something to see (and they discover it with us and we with them), but it is precisely this seeing that 
is also such that it makes us think (they offer us philosophical, ethical, educational questions as 
existential questions). Inventing a new cinematic language, using particular equipment and 
preparations, they show the complexity of reality, its unpredictable course, but also create a space 
of thought (the present as a gap, the issues as common issues) in which they invite us and attract 
us. 
Just like the writings of Arendt, the Dardennes’ films are ‘essays’ and experiments. They are 
not thought experiments, but are experiments in/of thought, the experiment being precisely the 
exposition of what they think and are. And therefore they are present in it. If it works out, then the 
reader or spectator is not only offered an insight, but also an experience, and this experience is also 
an experience of freedom, a freedom with regard to the way ‘things take their course’ (as 
‘sempiternal change’, in Arendt’s words). The reader or the spectator does not have to accept what 
is written or shown, or even believe it, but when witnessing this writing or filming, she can feel 
invited to partake in the risk of discourse and of a usage (of words and verbs) which are not assured 
and safe (immunised). She could feel reminded (by the way they are written or made, and the way 
their authors are present in the work) of her own difficulty (or perplexity), and therefore could be 
ready to engage in a vivid conversation or a ‘collective experiment’ (as Bruno Latour calls it 
[Latour, 2005]). 
Exercises of Thought and Creating Laboratories 
In line with the foregoing, I want to propose that we conceive of philosophy of education as 
‘exercises of thought’, where we put ourselves to the test of our educational present. These 
exercises illuminate, try to see, try to attend our present, try the words and the verbs once more, 
starting from ‘the actuality of incidents’. We can conceive of the space/time of these exercises, the 
space/time of suspension, as the one which is made in creating a laboratory. It is the place 
(space/time) to try to put one’s thinking to the test of reality (the place of the attempt and the 
essay). It is the place to study and to expose oneself to things, but these things are to be ‘made’ 
present, and we have to be present, to be attentive. Therefore the laboratory is also a place of 
registration. It develops the equipment (devices) to ‘see’ something, and entails preparations, not in 
order to see what we think, but to think what we see, to expose our thinking to what is happening 
and to get through our own reflections in order to see anew. 
To try the words and verbs again, we need to expose ourselves to concrete issues and should 
try to develop a particular ethos, a ‘way of doing’ or of working on the self in order to dismiss our 
reflections and to be able, so to speak, to catch what happens. In this respect, we can take 
suggestions from the Dardennes. They not only make use of particular devices (hand-held camera, 
clearly limited spaces, etc.), but refuse all kinds of financial, technical and intellectual comfort in 
order to displace themselves, to make themselves into strangers (Dardenne 2005). They rely on a 
particular discipline of the body and the mind to become attentive, to attend the present, to remain 
in the gap, to help them avoid to interpret and explain the present, to contextualise and historicise 
it, to help them, in trying to penetrate it through cutting and producing it (making fiction), to 
articulate questions (see also Masschelein & Simons, 2008). They indicate a way of doing which 
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refrains from activities of judgement and gatekeeping, which avoids explanations, interpretations, 
contextualisations, deconstructions. A way of doing which is ‘fictionising’, making, so to speak, 
reality and gathering a public. A way of doing as a public gesture, making things public, which 
means to set them free: to present them in the gap, detached from past and future (no longer 
appropriated), but also to create a public as people invited to share the concern with these things, 
people attached to the present. 
To conclude, I think that what is important today is to make the questions ‘what is 
education?’, ‘what is adulthood?’, ‘what is a child?’, ‘what is a university?’, ‘what is a school?’, ‘what 
is a family?’, ‘what is an asylum?’, ‘what is a teacher?’, ‘what is a student?’, etc. into ‘real questions’ 
and into ‘our questions’ – that is, into matters of concern (Latour, 2005). That is, no matters to be 
solved by facts (experts) or by addressing individual needs, but, rather, matters that make us think, 
putting ourselves to the test, trying to move in the gap between past and future, trying the words 
and verbs again. Things take their course, transformations of educational systems and institutions 
are deeply affecting us, and all kinds of forces are at work. The point is not to forget oneself as 
being the point at and through which the forces work, and where at and through which insight into 
the game of forces that constitutes our existence can be gained, as well as where at and through 
which they are split up and broken so that the words and verbs can be tried again and we can ‘gain 
some assurance in confronting specific questions’ (Arendt, 1968, p. 15). 
Notes 
[1] Suspending does not mean to erase or deny or ignore, but precisely to ‘temporarily prevent from ... 
being in force or effect’ (Oxford English Dictionary). 
[2] Of course there are parts and elements that subsist, but they do not work as a tradition any more, but 
appear today as ‘heritage’. 
[3] I am referring to the five films Luc and Jean-Pierre Dardenne made since the mid-nineties: La Promesse 
(1996), about a boy whose father exploits illegal immigrants and is confronted with the question of 
how to relate to his father when his father simply lets such an immigrant die when he falls from 
scaffolding during illegal construction works; Rosetta (1999, Golden Palm winner in Cannes), about a 
girl who is desperately trying to find a job in order to be able to simply survive and to sustain her 
mother, who is addicted to alcohol and with whom she lives on a camping site; Le Fils (2002), about a 
teacher-carpenter who works in a re-integration centre for troubled youth and is one day confronted 
with the young murderer of his own son who has come to the centre to become his apprentice (not 
knowing that the teacher is the father of the one he killed); L’Enfant (2005, Golden Palm winner in 
Cannes), about a young adolescent who has to deal with the issue of what it means to be a father 
when being confronted with his girlfriend’s (unplanned) pregnancy and the fact that she gives birth to 
the child; first he sells the child on the market for child-traffic, but then tries to bring the child back to 
the mother and find out how he can live together with her; and Le Silence de Lorna (2008), about a 
young Eastern European girl who has obtained a visa in Belgium and now, in order to get money, is 
involved in fake marriages in order to offer other rich Eastern Europeans the possibility of also 
obtaining a visa; she then has to deal with a young Belgian drug addict with whom she accidentally 
has to share an apartment. 
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the politics of the gap in educational transformation 
SHARON TODD 
Department of Education, Stockholm University, Sweden 
ABSTRACT Masschelein’s article works as both a proposal and an invitation: it proposes an existential 
orientation to questions of educational concern, and it invites everyone to think along with him, to 
implicate themselves in this particular exercise of thought. In response, therefore, the author seeks to 
create a conversation, one that reflects an exercise of her own thinking in relation to that of Jan’s – and 
highlights in her reply ‘in relation to’ for reasons which will become clearer in the article. She does this 
by building upon the main thinker with whom he is himself in conversation – namely, Hannah Arendt. 
First, however, the author offers a reading of what she sees as Masschelein’s main position and then 
turns to her own encounter with his text as an illustration of what she later discusses as ‘becoming 
present in context’ – a context in which the place of narrative occupies a central position. She then 
discusses what this means for the relation between philosophy of education and transformation. 
Moving away from the critical tradition, which has often marked philosophy’s relation to 
education, Masschelein proposes instead an ascetic turn, through which what is at stake is not the 
enlightenment of others, but the enlightenment of oneself. It seeks to transform or modify one’s 
mode of being and how one lives the present. Drawing primarily on Hannah Arendt – and also 
rooted in the thought of Michel Foucault and Jacques Rancière – Masschelein wishes us to take a 
journey – a parcours – through which we explore the ‘gap’ between past and future. 
Masschelein focuses specifically on Arendt’s depiction of this ‘gap’, which, as has been noted, 
is not the ‘present as we usually understand it’ and is made possible by the presence of man, who is 
inserted as an interruption in the flow of continuous time. On Masschelein’s reading of Arendt, it is 
this co-temporality of existence and the present that ought to lie at the heart of our educational 
endeavours – indeed, this is what Masschelein calls the ‘educational present’. And it is a present that 
reveals a certain truth about the ‘reality’ of education, about its Wirklichkeit in German (verklighet in 
Swedish), about its appearance as a work. Masschelein’s focus on the present leads him to a 
reformulation of philosophy as in fact a working of the gap, a working of the educational present. 
He renders philosophy therefore as education. Philosophy as an exercise becomes, for Masschelein, 
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a research that works on the self, a genre – the essay – that creates a public gesture, and an 
engagement with the present. 
In discussing the films of the Dardenne brothers – I myself have seen only one, Rosetta – he 
attempts to show how the exercise that is philosophy is prominent here. For Masschelein, the 
present is revealed through what happens before the camera, without interpretation or 
explanation. In his words, the films open up a ‘space of exposition, of being exposed to things that 
are exposed’. Through their films, Masschelein sees the potential for developing a direct 
engagement – an immediate engagement – with the present that is beyond story and narrative. The 
directors, to his mind, do not ‘direct’, but stage – mise en scène – they present the present, one 
might say, and turn the worlds of their characters into something ‘real’. This ‘ethos’ refuses the 
explanatory function of philosophy/theory and is meant to capture instead the experience of the 
present. 
With this said, Masschelein moves into his call for philosophy of education to become 
‘exercises of thought,’ spaces in which we essay, test, experiment with new vocabularies and create 
new publics. And it finds its expression in Masschelein’s notion of the laboratory. On Masschelein’s 
account, a laboratory ‘develops the equipment (devices) to “see” something, and entails 
preparations, not in order to see what we think, but to think what we see …’ Here, we are to 
reframe questions of education as being not merely matters of fact, but matters of (public) concern. 
It is a place to study and expose oneself, ‘to dismiss our reflections’, ‘to make something present’, 
‘to catch what happens’, like the Dardennes’ camera. It is to live in the gap, in the suspension of 
judgement and narrative. Thus, the relation Masschelein makes between philosophy of education 
and the transformation of educational systems turns on our capacity to be guided by the reality that 
appears before us – philosophy of education operates, therefore, not in a mode of criticality, but in 
a mode where the public posing of new questions takes centre stage. 
Now, I find what Masschelein argues for compelling, since it offers a new compass point for 
orienting ourselves and our work as one that is always drawn to the present, and because his idea 
of philosophy as exercise is important for making ourselves relevant (as philosophers of education) 
by, indeed, making ourselves present. Although I am sympathetic to the idea that in order to move 
beyond our myopic views of education – our taken-for-granted assumptions about education that 
severely limit our capacity to experience what is happening before us – we need to divest ourselves 
of our hubris, our arrogance in ‘knowing’ what is right, correct, predictable. I nonetheless want to 
offer some reflections about the way in which the present is cast here as an unproblematic and 
unambiguous appearance that is to be ‘experienced’ – immediately, without mediation – as though 
our stories or narratives are unimportant to ‘who’ we are. That is, what I wish to focus on further 
below is how we might consider the ‘gap’ between past and future, and our engagement with it, as 
being far messier than Masschelein lets on, particularly since any engagement is a specific, 
embodied event. 
So let’s turn to some specifics. Let’s say I read Masschelein’s paper with a certain presence – 
with attentiveness, passion and curiosity – and perhaps even a willingness to have my ideas 
challenged, to question myself, to test myself. But in so doing, do I come closer to the reality of 
myself, or to the reality of the world? Or, put in Masschelein’s terms, do I expose myself in such a 
way to his text, as to a film by the Dardenne brothers, so as to only see – the ethos of looking – 
what is in front me – the words on the page, the argument presented, the essay as a form of 
thinking? Well, that depends. And what it depends on, in my view, is context. 
Masschelein asks us to leave our stories behind – whether these be in the form of theoretical 
formulations, practical explanations or personal narratives – and the emotional attachments all 
these entail, as a condition for experiencing the present. To some degree, many other philosophers 
have suggested similar things. For example, Emmanuel Levinas makes clear that the alterity of the 
other is violated once one attempts to contain it within categories, explanations and discourse. 
However, what makes Masschelein’s plea for experiencing the present different from the work of 
someone like Levinas is that the Levinasian other is nonetheless in a context that calls upon the self 
to respond. There is a transactional space, a relational space explicit in the ethic of responsibility. 
Wishing to move away from – indeed, suspending – this relational trajectory, on Masschelein’s 
account, we are left with a self who ‘experiences’ an abstract present on non-relational terms. That 
is, leaving our stories behind in Masschelein’s terms risks translating into an engagement with the 
present that seems to have no context. 
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I wish to argue that context – context as literally a ‘with’ or ‘of’ the text – is uniquely specific. 
To return to my example of reading Masschelein’s essay, this concerns not only what I bring with 
me into the reading encounter, lugging my biographical baggage, my intellectual preferences, my 
desire or not to journey into unfamiliar territory; it also concerns how I read this piece knowing I 
would be responding publicly to it, offering something for others to consider and, hopefully, think 
about; it also concerns the place and time of reading, the chair, the aeroplane, the darkness of night, 
my lack of sleep. What I want to suggest here is that this context is not merely incidental to my 
experience, but is constitutive of it. This context – this ‘with’ the text – is actually constitutive of 
the gap between past and future. There is no gap without this context. That is, the gap is not really 
a present in a purified sense, but the space of mediation, the space inhabited by flesh-and-blood 
persons, who, each in their own way, expose themselves to actual, other flesh-and-blood persons 
who are also attempting to make a life in the gap. It is a space of exposure in which there is no 
purity about reality, about what is happening out there; it is a space of context and relationality. 
Following Arendt herself on this point, the space between unique beings is a political space, a 
space constituted by speech and action. And we live best in the gap, according to her, in times of 
revolution, when we break through the forces of tradition and future expectation. She illustrates 
this with reference to one of Kafka’s parables, where an unnamed ‘he’ struggles with two 
antagonists. ‘He’ is pressed from behind, by the origin, while simultaneously the road ahead is 
being blocked. Caught between the past and future, ‘he’ dreams of jumping out of the fray to take 
the position of umpire over his antagonists. Arendt is critical of Kafka’s move to remove ‘him’ out 
of the struggle; instead, she thinks the whole point is to engage in that space in such a way that is 
directly political – that is, by acting and speaking – and not just thinking – with others. 
Of course, to some extent, Masschelein echoes this Arendtian move by insisting on the public 
nature of engaging the educational present. But what gets left aside, I think, is the explicitly 
narrative, relational aspects of the public that Arendt is after. The gap is neither abstract nor 
general, for Arendt, but is a specific space where speech and action occur – and it is messy because 
it is a plural space – a space in which each one of us is engaged in becoming present. 
She sees this relational space as central to political life and is resistant to even well-intentioned 
attempts to do away with the inevitable antagonism, or ‘calamities’, that arise out of plurality: 
The calamities of action all arise from the human condition of plurality, which is the condition 
sine qua non for this space of appearance which is the public realm. Hence to do away with this 
plurality is always tantamount to the abolition of the public realm itself. (Arendt, 1959, p. 197) 
Within the public realm – the polis – there is not only agonism but also a certain unpredictability as 
to the consequences of our speech and action as they are storied through narrative. Such 
unpredictability is ushered in first by the fact that the actor is ‘not merely a “doer” but always and 
at the same time a sufferer’ (Arendt, 1959, p. 169). In this, the actor sets a story in motion – through 
word or deed – that is composed of its consequent deeds and sufferings. That is, the consequences 
of who we are as we speak are boundless, and as such, occasion responses that in turn affect us 
(asymmetrical reciprocity). Second, there is an unpredictability to the story insofar as it leaves 
behind the intentions of the actor/speaker and becomes articulated in the voice of others. That is, 
the speaker/actor is not the author of her story, but the story gets made and retold by others, 
which rebound back to her, hitting her unawares (Arendt, 1959, p. 171). 
What Arendt shows us is that the relational space in between us is not only fundamentally 
political but also narrative in character. It is a space that is necessarily fraught with moments of 
agonism, since each of us is revealed and discloses herself differently. That we depend on others to 
hear and respond to our words and deeds, our stories, means that when we speak to others we risk 
also having to bear the story others have created about us, about who we are. 
As the Italian feminist philosopher Adriana Cavarero writes, ‘actively revealing oneself to 
others, with words and deeds, grants a plural space and therefore a political space to identity – 
confirming its exhibitive, relational and contextual nature’ (Cavarero, 2000, p. 22). 
Thus this exchange is also fraught with vulnerability and exposure, as Cavarero – not unlike 
Masschelein – states it, which, to my mind, is the reason why there can be painful consequences to 
one becoming present in the gap between past and future. As Arendt says, each act of the 
speaker/doer occasions suffering, which makes politics also an eminently affective engagement 
with plurality – in context. 
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It is not that context is deterministic. It is not about seeing that we are located in positions 
that then form how we perceive the world and others with whom we live. Rather, it is to do with 
the unexpected ways in which I appear to others – and consequently to myself – through speech 
and action. Context is not about prescribing some social essence (which would lead to a simple 
form of identity politics); instead, context is about the materiality of my becoming present. 
Thus, I agree with Masschelein that philosophy is an exercise that engages with the present, 
but it is always a specific present, in a specific context, that is both political and narrative in 
character, and which is redolent with the potentiality of suffering. In this sense, if philosophy of 
education is going to be about attending to this present, of conducting what Arendt calls thought 
landscapes, then it also needs to concern itself not just with the abstract questions of what 
education (or mothers, daughters, teachers, etc.) are ‘today’, but with the specific questions of what 
they mean in their varied material manifestations of public life. For, in my view, the transformation 
of the researcher is not just about adopting an attitude of openness, it is an exposure that risks the 
very sense of ‘who’ – not what – she is. 
I also agree with Masschelein that the transformations of self that occur in the in-between 
space of togetherness with others and in the time of the gap between past and future are eminently 
educational. But I have wanted to suggest here that if we see the gap between past and future as a 
political space, then philosophy of education’s role is not only an exercise in thought, but an 
exercise in political thought, one committed to an attentiveness to becoming present in context. 
And by virtue of the political character of exercises in thought, do we, as philosophers of education, 
not then take on a more expansive role in public discussions of educational transformation? This is 
only one of the questions that Jan’s essay has provoked me to consider – and I thank him for that. 
References 
Arendt, H. (1959) The Human Condition. New York: Anchor Books. 
Cavarero, A. (2000). Relating Narratives: storytelling and selfhood. New York: Routledge. 
 
 
Correspondence: Sharon Todd, Professor of Education, Department of Education, Stockholm 
University, SE-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden (sharon.todd@edu.su.se). 
